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RECENT CASES.
Constitutional Law-Commerce Clause-Power of State to Tax
Foreign Insurance Companies-An out-of-state insurance company
sought to determine the legality of a three percent tax levied by Indiana
on insurance premiums collected within the state.1 Domestic companies
were exempt from this tax but were required to pay a one percent tax
upon their gross income and a capital stock tax which amounted proportionately to two-thirds of the premium tax. Held,2 that the tax law was
constitutional on the grounds, (i) it did not discriminate against interstate
commerce, and (2) even if the tax were discriminatory Congress has
authorized it by the passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.' State V.
PrudentialInsurance Company of America, Newark, N. J., 64 N. E. (2d)
150 (1945).
The inflexible doctrine that a state cannot regulate interstate commerce 4 has been modified to the extent that in the absence of action by
Congress,' state regulation is permissible only as long as it does not unduly
burden or discriminate against interstate commerce.6 What constitutes
an undue burden or a discrimination is a legal conclusion that the courts
determine after studying the facts in every case and applying former decisions. The distinction between the taxes deemed permissible and those
condemned is largely a question of degree, but in general the decisions are
predicated on the likelihood of the tax being used to place interstate commerce at a competitive disadvantage.7 In the field of insurance, however,
i. IND. STAT. ANN. (Bums 1933)-, Vol. 18, § 39-4802.

The premium tax' was declared unconstitutional by the Marion County Superior
Court on the ground that it discriminated against interstate commerce.
3. Pub. L. No. 15, 7 9 th Cong., 1st Sess. (March 9, 1945), i5 U. S. C. A. § ioiX
(Sup. 1945).
2.

4. Chief Justice Marshall set forth the doctrine that the power to regulate commerce is exclusively vested in Congress, and no part of it can be exercised by a state,
in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 198 (U. S. 1824).
5. "In the relation of the states to the regulation of interstate commerce by Congress there are two fields. There is one in which the State cannot interfere at all,
even in the silence of Congress. In the other (and this is the one in which the legitimate exercise of the State's police power brings it into contact with interstate commerce so as to affect that commerce), the State may exercise its police power until
Congress has by affirmative legislation occupied the field by regulating interstate commerce and so necessarily has excluded state action." Oregon-Washington R. R. v.
State of Washington, 270 U. S. 87, 101, 46 Sup. Ct. 279, 283 (1926). Wilson v. BlackBird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245 (U. S. 1829) (in the absence of Congressional regulation over small navigable creeks, a state statute authorizing the erection of a dam
cannot be considered repugnant to the powers of the Congress to regulate commerce).
6. "In each case it is our duty to determine whether the statute under attack,
whatever its name may be, will in its practical operation work discrimination against
interstate commerce. . . . Interstate commerce can hardly thrive in so hostile an
atmosphere." Best & Company v. Maxwell, 311 U. S. 454, 455, 6r Sup. Ct. 334, 335
(1940).
7. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. State of Texas, 210 U. S. 217, 28 Sup. Ct. 638
(in which a state tax of one per cent. of gross receijts held to be a burden on interstate commerce). License taxes requiring a corporation engaged in interstate commerce to a pay a certain percentage of its capital stock have been rejected, Looney v.
Crane Co., 245 U. S. 178, 38 Sup. Ct. 85 (1917) ; and have been sustained when apportioned to that part of the capital which was attributable to intrastate activity, Ford
Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 3o8 U. S. 331, 6o Sup. Ct. 273 (1939). In the same manner
privilege taxes requiring a percentage of gross receipts have been condemned because
of the danger that each state in which the corporation does business may impose a
(323)
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the states have been left with a free hand to supervise and tax the insur-"
ance business because until recently the Supreme Court has consistently
maintained the illogical position that insurance is not interstate commerce.8
In 1944 by the four to three decision in United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n., the Court brushed aside this fiction and ruled that
insurance is subject to regulation by Congress by virtue of the commerce
clause. 10 Consequently serious doubt was raised as to the validity of state
taxes which may be thought to discriminate against foreign insurance companies. 1 In the instant case the premium tax was not considered discriminatory because the out-of-state companies continued to make money
and outdistance the domestic companies. 2 Such a test is illogical. Since
the domestic taxes are not equal to the premium tax the foreign companies
are necessarily placed at a competitive disadvantage," therefore the premium tax would be invalid in the absence of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
But by this statute Congress has provided that the regulation and
taxation of the insurance business shall remain under the control of the
states. 14 Thus Congress has affirmatively delegated its power to regulate
similar tax, Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. State of Texas (supra). A tax imposed
only on foreign corporations for the privilege of doing business in the state is invalid
as applied to corporations doing an interstate business generally, International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 30 Sup. Ct. 481 (ig1o) ; but if the business only inci-

dentally or remotely affects interstate commerce the tax is not invalid, Southern
Natural Gas Corp. v. Alabama, 3O U. S. 148, 57 Sup. Ct. 696 (1937).
8. Field, J., p. 183, "Issuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce." Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (U. S. 1868). In reviewing the line of cases
since Paul v. Virginia. supra, McKenna, J., said, "If we consider these cases . . they
constitute a formidable body of authority. . . . For over forty-five years they
have beeen the legal justification for such legislation. To reverse the case therefore, would require us to promulgate a new rule of constitutional inhibition upon the
States and which would compel a change of their policy and a readjustmeit of their
laws. Such result necessarily urges against a change of decision." New York Life
Insurance Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U. S. 495, 502, 34 Sup. Ct. x67, 169 (1913)

(dealing with a premium receipt tax on insurance companies). For criticism on this
subject, see Innes. Insurance in its Relation to the Commerce Clause of the Federal
Constitution (1900) 48 U. OF PA. L. REv. 717; Berke, Is the Business of Insurance
Commerce? (1943) 42 MicH. L. REv. 409.
9. 322 U. S. 533, 64 Sup. Ct. 162 (1944).

io. Black, J., delivered the majority opinion (Stone, C. J., Frankfurter and Jackson, JJ., dissenting) which held, that an insurance company conducting a substantial
part of its business across state lines is engaged in interstate commerce and is subject
to regulation by Congress in the form of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
ii. In the absence of federal intervention most states developed extensive and
effective systems of insurance control. By this decision the insurance companies and
also the state officials were thrown in doubt as to the validity of regulatory legislation
of insurance companies. Partridge, States' Rights and Insurance-After S. E. U. A.
(1945)

268 INs. L. J. 265; Legis. (1945) 33 GEo. L. J. 321.

"Certainly there cannot but be serious doubt as to the validity of state taxes which
may now be thought to discriminate against the interstate commerce, . . . While
this court no longer adheres to the inflexible rule that a state cannot in some measure
regulate interstate commerce, the application of the test presently applied requires 'a
consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances' in order to determine whether
the matter is an appropriate one for local regulation and whether the regulation does
not unduly burden interstate commerce, Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341, 362-a determination which can only be made upon a case-to-case basis." U. S. v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n. (supra at 581 et seq.) (dissenting opinion, Stone, C. 3.).
12. Supra at 156.
13. "Forms of state taxation whose tendency is to prohibit the commerce or place

it at a disadvantage as compared or in competition with intrastate commerce and any
state tax which discriminates against the commerce, are familiar examples of the
exercise of state taxing power in an unconstitutional manner." McGoldrick v. BerwindWhite Coal Mining Co., 309 U. S. 33, 45, 6o Sup. Ct. 388, 391 (1940).

14. Sec. 2 (a) "The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall
be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation
of such business."
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a specific field of interstate commerce to the states which has the effect of
removing the limitations which the Commerce Clause imposed upon the
states. 15 The Supreme Court has not yet been faced with the problem of
interpreting the So.uth-Eastern Underwriters decision in light of the McCarran Act.' 6 When the issue is presented it would seem apparent that the
Court is constrained to declare the state premium tax constitutional in view
of the express provisions of the Act and upon consideration that any steps
taken toward the nationalization of the control7 of insurance should be a
function of Congress and not of the Judiciary.

Constitutional Law-Post Office-Power of Postmaster General
to Withdraw Second-Class Mailing Privilege-On October 14, 1943,
Postmaster General Frank Walker appointed a hearing board to investigate
charges contained in a citation alleging that Esquire magazine published
obscene material.1 Later there was a modification of the charge to the
effect that if Esquire was not obscene it did not meet the fourth requirement of the statute governing the second-class mailing privilege.2 The
Sec. 2 (b) "No act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business,
. ." with the exception of
the anti-trust statutes and a moratorium is placed upon them until Jan. 1,1948.
15. For a discussion of the subject in connection with an earlier statute, see McGovney, The Webb-Kenyon Law and Beyond (1917) 3 IoWA L. REv. 145.
16. In a recent case a statute substantially the same as the tax in the principal
case was sustained on the ground that it was not a violation of the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. It was not contended that
the law was in violation of the Commerce Clause, so the question above was not presented. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. Read_325 U. S.673. 65 Sup. Ct. 122o
(1945) ; see State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U. S. 154, 65 Sup. Ct. 573

(1945) (Wis. statute compelling foreign insurance companies to make a deposit as a
condition for a license upheld under police power of the state).
17. Suits are now pending in Oklahoma, Michigan, Ohio, Nebraska, and Alabama,
in which the constitutionality of state premium taxes will be tested. South Carolina
and Kansas have sustained premium taxes imposed only upon foreign insurers. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Murphy, 35 S.E. (2d) 586 (1945) ; It re Insurance
Tax Cases, 16o Kan. 300, 161 P. (2d) 726 (1945). On the other hand, twenty states
have followed the admonition of Mr. Justice Jackson, in his dissenting opinion in the
South-Eastern Underwriters' case, P. 590, that, "The Court's decision at very least
will require an extensive overhauling of state legislation relating to taxation and supervision," and have revised their insurance laws to provide equal and non-discriminatory
taxation of foreign and domestic companies alike. Tye, The Aftermath of the S. E.
U. A. Case (1945) 23 TAxEs 61o.
For advantages of state regulation of local insurance matters, see Wolfe, State
Supervision of Insurance Companies (I9o5) 26 ANNALs 137. Contra: Innes, loc. cit.
supra, note 6.
I. 31 STAT. 1104 (1901), 39 U. S. C. 232 (1940).

"When any publication has

been accorded second-class privileges, the same shall not be suspended or annulled until
a hearing shall have been granted to the parties interested."
2. 20 STAT. 359 (1879), 39 U. S. C. §226 (1Q4o).
The conditions under which
a publication shall be admitted as second-class matter are as follows: "First. It must
regularly be issued at stated intervals, as frequently as four times a year, and bear
a date of issue, and be numbered consecutively. Second. It must be issued from a
known office of publication. Third. It must be formed of printed paper sheets, without board, cloth, leather, or other substantial binding, such as distinguishes printed
books for preservation from periodical publications: Provided, that publications produced by the stencil, . . . shall not be regarded as printed within the meaning of
this class. Fourth. It must be originated and published for the dissemination of information of a public character, or devoted to literature, the sciences, arts, or some
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hearing board, one member dissenting, recommended that the proceedings
be dismissed. Shortly thereafter the Postmaster General overruled the
findings of the board and revoked the second-class mailing privileges of
the magazine on the grounds that it made no special contribution to the
public good and the general welfare. 8 The publishers of the magazine
were permitted to use the second-class, mailing privilege pending the decision in their application for an injunction, with the publishers responsible
for additional mailing costs if the court upheld the action of the Postmaster
General. The District Court denied the injunction on the grounds that
the Postmaster General's order was not censorship, because it was based
on classification; it was not capricious or arbitrary and was not, therefore,
subject to judicial review, by analogy to draft board orders. 4 The circuit
court of appeals reversed the judgment of the district court.5 On certiorari,
held judgment of the circuit court affirmed. The standards set up by the
statute covering the second-class mailing privilege relate to the format of
publication and to the nature of the contents, but not to their quality,
worth, or value. The power to determine whether a periodical contains
information of a public character, literature, or art does not include the
further power to determine whether the contents meet some standard of
the public good or welfare. Hankegan v. Esquire, Inc., 66 Sup. Ct. 456
(1946)

.1

There are certain types of publications which are nonmailable7 However, it was not the contention of the Postmaster General that-Esquire was
nonmailable but rather that it did not meet the requirements of second
class matter.8 By dividing publications into classes for the purpose of
establishing rate differentials, 9 Congress has, in effect, granted a subsidy
to publications which can meet the requirements of the lower cost classifications. 10 Therefore, to the extent that the Postmaster General may revoke
the second-class mailing privilege of a publication,' not because it is nonmailable, but because it does not contribute to the public good and general
welfare, he may exercise a censorship which amounts to a power of life or
death over the publication. 1 In the past it has been held that the use of
special industry, and having a legitimate list of subscribers. Nothing herein contained
shall be so construed as to admit to the second-class rate regular publications designed primarily for advertising purposes, or for free circulation, or for circulation at
nominal rates."
3. Post Office Department Order No. 23, 459 (1943).
4. Esquire, Inc. v. Walker, 55 Fed. Supp. lo5 (1944).
5. Esquire, Inc. v. Walker, 151 F. (2d) 49 (1945).
6. Postmaster General Hannegan who took office after the commencement of this
suit was substituted for his predecessor, Postmaster General Walker, who had issued
the order against Esquire.
7. 35 STAT. 1129, 18 U. S. C. § 334 forbids mailing obscene matter. 18 U. S. C.
§ 335 forbids libelous or indecent matter on wrappers or envelopes. 18 U. S. C. § 336
forbids the mailing of lottery or gift enterprise circulars. 351STAT. 1130, 18 U. S. C.
§ 338 covers frauds and counterfeit money, and 18 U. S. C. § 338a forbids the sending
of threatening communications. In U. S. v. Males, 51 Fed. 41 (1892) the test of
obscenity was held to be whpther the tendency of the matter was to deprave and corrupt the morals of those into whose hands it fell.
8. Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 66 Sup. Ct. at p. 458.
9. 20 STAT. 358, 39 U. S. C. § 221 established four classes of mail. 20 STAT. 359,
39 U. S. C. § 224 defined second-class matter. 39 U. S. C. § 225 granted the right of
inspection at the office of mailing. § 226, see note 2 supra.
IO. It was estimated that the loss of the second-class privilege would cost the publishers of Esquire $5o0,ooo per year.

ii. United States ex rel. Milwaukee Democratic Publishing Company v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407 (1921). Justice Brandeis (dissenting) said in part, "It is argued
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the mails is a privilege which Congress may grant or withhold.1 2 On the
basis of this interpretation the Postmaster General has, on some occasions,
withdrawn that privilege by the application of a strict technical interpretation of the mailing statute. For example, in the Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing case 13 an issue of the publication involved violated the
Espionage Act and was held to be nonmailable. The periodical, therefore,
missed an issue and was held to be not regularly published. As a result
of this previous restraint it could not meet the requirements of secondclass matter. 14 But the issues of Esquire which were involved here were
not nonmailable. Hence, the use of the privilege doctrine as the basis for
refusing to allow the publication to be mailed as second-class matter was
extended into a new area. In this case the magazine was to be denied the
use of the second-class rate because it had failed to carry out what was
interpreted as a positive duty of contributing to the public good and the
public welfare. What constitutes such a contribution? What legislative
body could define it in all-inclusive terms? Or lacking such definition, is
the minimum contribution to public good required to retain the privilege
of second-class matter to be defined by a single individual? 5 The possible
far reaching consequences of such a policy are apparent even though the
courts may bar action that is capricious or arbitrary. While it is true that
the subsidy granted through the second-class mailing privilege has resulted
in a great mass of periodicals ranging from those possessed of great utility
to those with virtually none,' until any one of these can be cited as nonmailable, it would seem to be the lesser danger to permit publications which
might be classed as of border line utility to continue to be mailed under the
second-class privilege.

Criminal Law-Arrest-Right of Officer to Kill to Prevent
Escape of Suspected Felon-Defendant, a chief of police, obtained a
confession from an automobile thief, implicating two other thieves with
whom the confessed thief had an appointment four hours later. Defendant
and a party of officers, all but one of whom were in civilian clothing, sought
to arrest two persons at the appointed time and place, but the suspects,
believing that they were being held up, fled. Defendant shot and killed
both of them. They were not the persons identified by the thief. At the
trial for involuntary manslaughter the judge charged: "The notion that
a peace officer may in all cases shoot one who flees from him when about
to be arrested is unfounded. Officers have no such power except in case
of felonies. .

.

. An officer may lawfully arrest on suspicion of felony,

but is only warranted in using such force as is allowable in other cases not
The right of an
felonious, unless the offense was in fact a felony. . ..
officer to kill an escaping felon is limited to cases in which the officer
that although a newspaper is barred from second-class mail, liberty of circulation is
not denied, because the first and third-class mail and other means of transportation are
left open to a publisher. Constitutional rights should not be frittered away by arguments so technical and unsubstantial."
12. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S.727 (1878).
13. See note II, stpra.
14. See note 2, supra, for conditions imposed by the statute.
15. Since the custom of rewarding the national chairman of the successful party
in a presidential election with the Postmaster Generalship has been so well-established,
the possibility of political censorship must be given consideration. While such a possibility may seem remote at the moment it involves an element of democratic government that is too vital to be lightly dismissed.
16. Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., supra, p. 461.
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knows that the person whom he seeks to arrest is a felon and not an
innocent person." Defendant excepted, inter alia, to quoted portions of
the charge, and, upon conviction, assigned them as error. Held, affirmed,
"charge was clear and comprehensive," assignment of error not sustainable.
Commonwealth v. Duerr, i58 Pa. Super. 484, 45 A. (2d) 235 (1946).
This is the first occasion on which a Pennsylvania appellate court has

laid down a rule defining the -right of an officer, making a lawful arrest
without warrant, to kill to prevent the escape of an innocent suspected
felon.1 Three different principles have been set forth by various authorities 2: (i) Killing is privileged if the officer has a reasonable belief that
a felony has been committed and that the person killed committed the
felony in question.3 (2) Killing is privileged if a felony has been committed and the arresting officer reasonably believes that the person killed
committed the felony.4 (3) Killing is privileged only if the person killed
committed the felony. 5 The first view has some support. The second
i. The court stated, p. 491, ". . • we have found no clear-cut rule announced by
the appellate courts of this commonwealth. . . ." Commonwealth v. Greer, 2o Pa.
Co. Ct. 535 (1898) and Commonwealth v. Megary, 8 Phila. 616 (1871) deny privilege
to kill fleeing suspect, but are cases where no felony had been committed. Commonwealth v. Long, 17 Pa. Super. 641 (igoi) held deadly force justifiable in case of actual
felony committed by the suspect. In Commonwealth v. Max, 8 Phila. 422 (1870), the
court charged, "an officer of justice may, even upon suspicion, arrest the offender,
and if he resist or escape, the officer will be justified if he slay. . . ." (Facts not

stated in report.) In Commonwealth v. Loughhead, 218 Pa. 429 (i9o7), after denying
that deadly force is justifiable in case of misdemeanor, the court stated, p. 431, "The
rule is otherwise when felony has been charged or has been committed in the presence
of the officer."
2. For the sake of brevity no mention is made of such factors affecting the right
to kill in making an arrest without warrant, as cases of misdemeanor as opposed to
felony, excessive force, necessity for notice of authority to person arrested, or resistence. The court stated, ".

.

. we . . . do not question . . . that a peace offi-

cer may arrest one upon the reasonable suspicion of a felony without a warrant (McCarthy v. DeArmit, 99 Pa. 63) and that he is not always bound to give the party to
be arrested notice that he is a legally qualified officer . . . although in most cases
it may be prudent to do so, Commonwealth v. Long, 17 Pa. Super. 641, Shovelin v.
Commonwealth, io6"Pa. 369, 372 . . . even a felon cannot be killed in an effort to
arrest him without criminal responsibility, unless he cannot otherwise be captured:
Commonwealth v. Micuso, 273 Pa. 474, 477, 117 A. 211," I58 Pa. Super. 484, 491, 45
A. (2d) 235, 238.
3. People v. Kilvington, 104 Cal. 86, 37 Pac. 799 (1894) ; RESTATEMENT, ToRTs
(1934) § 131, example No. 4; 2 Hale P. C. 85. Accord: Coldeen v. Reid, lO7 Wash.
508, 182 Pac. 59_9 (1919). Some dicta support the principle that an officer has a privilege to use any force necessary to affect a lawful arrest: Brown v. State, 62 N. J. L.
666, 42 A. 811 (1899), but there should be a duty of greater care in identification of a
suspect against whom force is used than in cases of arrest without the use of force.
See Dixon v. State, IOI Fla. 840, 132 So. 684 (1931).
4. Although the principle stated is generally accepted in cases of actual felons,
the cases are by no means clearly stated when the suspect is innocent: in Young v.
Amis, 220 Ky. 484, 486, 295 S. W. 431, 432 (1927), the court stated, "an officer is not

justified in killing one in order to affect his arrest on mere suspicion that he has committed a felony . . . and can justify only on the ground that a felony has been
committed.

.

"." In Wiley v. State, i

Ariz. 346, 170 Pac. 869 (1918), in which

the facts were similar to the instant case, a felony had occurred, but the court held
that the defendant had no reasonable grounds for suspecting innocent persons, one of
whom he had shot. See: McKeon v. National Casualty Co., 216 Mo. App. 507, 527,
270 S. W. 707, 713 (1925) ; Union Indemnity Co. v. Webster, 218 Ala. 468, ii8 So.
794 (1928); H. L. Wilgus, Arrest Without Warrant (1924) 22 MIcH. L. REV. 541,
812; R. M. Perkins, Law of Arrest (1940) 25 IowA L. REv. 200, 276; K. G. Pearson,
Right to Kill in Making Arrest (1930) 28 MIcHr. L. REv. 957, 968.

5. Conraddy v. People, 5 Park. 234 (N. Y., 1862), described by Perkins, loc. cit.,
as "a very poorly considered case by a court not of last resort." This view is supported
by a dictum in O'Connor v. State, 64 Ga. 125 (879), but no felony had occurred. In
Texas an officer may kill only in self-defense, TExAs ANN. Cam. STATS. (Vernon,
1936) §

1212

(8).
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and third are both apparently supported by a number of cases, but confused terminology makes analysis difficult. For example, in the leading
6
from which a portion of the charge in the
case Petrie v. Cartwright,
instant case is taken,7 after criticism of the common law rule allowing an
officer to kill a felon in order to arrest him, the court stated, "where no
felony has been committed the reason of the rule does not apply, and it
seems to us that the sacredness of human life and danger of abuse do not
permit an extension of the commori law rule to cases of suspected felonies
:

.

. where there is only suspicion of felony the officer is not warranted

in treating the fugitive as a felon." The terminological problem, on which
the very substantial distinction between the second and third views is
based, depends on the construction of the expression "suspicion of felony,"
whether it means suspicion of offense or suspicion of both offense and
person.8 The weight of authority appears to favor the second view, and
examination of most of the cases apparently supporting the third indicates
that the decisions may in fact be based on excessive force or on the unreasonable belief of the arresting officer. 9 In the instant case, which
inclines to the third view, the opinion and the quoted portions of the
charge confuse suspicion of offense and person.' 0 The case on the merits
achieves the desirable result, which could have logically been obtained
under the second view, as the conduct of the defendant appeared wholly
unreasonable to the trial court." A modification of the right to use deadly
force, even against an actual felon, is to forbid such force except in the
case of more serious felonies.' 2 This limitation is promulgated by the
Restatement of the Law, Torts,13 which is mentioned but not followed in
the opinion.' 4 Efficient and zealous law enforcement must be secured, but
6. 114 Ky. 103, 70 S. W. 297 (902).

7. Compare quoted portions of charge, supra, which are set forth at greater length
.n (1946) 94 Pittsburgh Legal Journal 155, 165, with statement at pp. 17, 172 of the

same case.
8. See Wilgus, op. cit., supra, note 4, at 812.
9. People v. McCarthy, 11o N. Y. 3o9, i8 N. E. 128 (1888), held that a succession

of felonies in the neighborhood did not justify defendant officer's belief in regard to
the guilt of the deceased. A higher standard of reasonableness is applied to cases of
killing than to simple arrest, Dixon v. State. ioi Fla. 84o, 132 So. 684 (1931). See
Pearson and Wilgus, loc. cit., supra, note 4. It is noted that a few courts have refused
to apply the standard of absolute guilt of the suspect in the absence of reasonable belief on the part of the officer in cases of arrest: People v. Ward, 226 Mich. 45, 196
N. W. 971 (1924), State v. Grant, 79 Mo. 113 (1883) ; both cases are criticized in J.
B. Waite, Some Inadequacies in the Law of Arrest (1931) 29 MIcHa. L. REv. 448, and
Public Policy and the Arrest of Felons (1933) 31 MIcH. L. Rxv. 749, S. B. Warner,
Modern Trends in the Anerican Law of Arrest (1943) 21 CAN. BAR RxV. 192, 199.
io. ".

. . neither an officer,

. . . is justified in killing the suspect in order

to affect an arrest, no matter how reasonable the grounds of suspicion may be, unless
a felony has actually been committed."

".

. . a homicide by an officer seeking to

make an arrest can only be justified by showing the actual commission of a felony . . ." but compare, "The felony in question must have been committed by the
person whom the officer is presently seeking to arrest." 158 Pa. Super. 484, 491-93,
45 A. (2d) 239.
ii.

(1946) 94 Pittsburgh Legal Journal 155, 173.

Petrie v. Cartwright, supra, Story v: State, 71 Ala. 329, 338 (1882), U. S. v.
E. H. Bohlen and H. Shulman, Arrest With and Without
Clark, 31 F. 710 (887).
a Warrant (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REV. 485, 494.
13. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 131: "The use of force against another by
means intended or likely to cause death is privileged, if (a) the arrest is made for a
felony which normally causes or threatens death or serious bodily harm, or which in12.

volves the breaking and entry of a dwelling place,

.

.

."

Although accepted by the

American Law Institute for the Restatement, Torts, this humane and practical limitation was rejected for the Code of Criminal Procedure, American Law Institute, Pro-

ceedings, Vol. IX, pp. 179-200.
14. 158 Pa. Super. 484, 493, 45 A. (2d)

235, 239.
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with it there must be a maximum amount of personal security. It is submitted that both objectives may be obtained by permitting an officer to use
deadly force against an escaping suspect only when a serious felony has
actually been committed and when he has reasonable grounds for belief
and does believe that the person against whom such force is used committed
the felony in question.' 5

of Survivor's 'Testimony
Evidenc -Witnesses-Admissibility
when Party to a Suit-The defendant died while litigation was pending in a federal court 1 on an action brought by the plaintiff to recover for
injuries sustained when he was struck by defendant's automobile. The
plaintiff then became the only eye-witness to the accident, but his testimony
was rejected by the trial judge and judgment was given for the defendant.
Held, affirmed. The plaintiff's testimony was inadmissible in accordance
with the survivor rule which remains applicable under the existing federal
rules. Wright v. Wilson, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Mar. 27, 1946, p. i,
col. 5 (C. C. A. 3rd).
The common law rule which prohibited parties to a suit from acting
as witnesses was founded upon the prejudice supposed to exist because
of their personal interest in the outcome.' This rule was long ago abolished in England 3 and it never gained a foothold in this country because
in almost every jurisdiction statutes were passed removing the common
law disability of parties from being witnesses. 4 A single exception was
made, however, in civil cases where the testimony concerned consisted of
transactions with a person since deceased ' and this notorious exception
remains the law today." Under the federal rules of civil procedure it is
provided that all evidence shall be admitted if it is admissible under the
federal statutes, or under previous federal equity practice, or under the
existing state law.7 In the instant case the plaintiff's testimony is not
i5. Comment on the policy arguments for effective law enforcement may be found
in Waite and Warner, loc.'cit., supra, note 9.

i. The action was brought for reason of diversity in the U. S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
2. McKELvEy, EVIDENCE (5th ed. 1944) 516. See authorities cited in the opinion
r
of the court, notes 8-12.
3. St. 9 & io Vict. c. 95. §83 (1846); St. I4 & 15 Vict. c. 99. §2 (I85i); St.
32 & 33 Vict. c. 68 (I869).
4. 1 WHARTON, EvIDENCE (2d ed. 1879) 412, § 464. The earliest statute was that
of Connecticut in 1849.
5. 2 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. I94O) § 578, "In almost every jurisdiction in
the United States, by statutes enacted in connection with or shortly after the statute
removing the general disqualification by interest, an exception was carved out of the
old disqualification and was allowed to perpetuate within a limited scope the principle
of the discarded rule. The scope of this modern rule excludes the testimony of the
survivor of a transactionwith a decedent, when offered against the latter's estate."
McKELvEY, op. cit. supra note 2 at 521, "There has, however, been a revival, if
not survival, of the disqualifying rule in certain instances, where the subject of the
testimony consists of transactions with a person since deceased or insane. In such
cases it is quite generally provided by statute that a person interested is incompetent
to testify as to the transactions with the deceased in an action against the executor,
administrator, or committee of such person." For a typical statute, see infra note 8.
6. Statutes in a few states prohibit the exclusion of the survivor's testimony: GEN.
STAT. CONN. 1930, N 5608, 56og; GEN. LAws MAss. 1921, c. 233, § 66; CODE ORE.
1930, § 9-403; LAws R. 1. 1915, c. 1259.
7. FED. RULES CMIL PRoc. § 723c, Rule 43 (a).

1946]

RECENT CASES,

allowed by the state law.8 There is no federal legislation admitting such
evidence,9 and the rules applicable in the federal equity courts are identical
with the rules of evidence in the common law courts.10 The survivor's
testimony is thereby excluded because of a rule of disqualification which
is a survival of the past based on a fallacious and dikarded principle." In
reaching their decision the court deplored this rule as being unsound and
undesirable, but none the less they were compelled to follow it.' 2 Moreover, they recommended that the rule be removed by legislative action or
court rule which applies generally.' 3 The Model Code of Evidence proposed by the American Law Institute and also statutes in a few of the
states 14 now provide for testimony by the survivor,' 5 and through a cor8. 28 PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 28, § 322: "Nor, where any party to a
thing or contract in action is dead . . . shall any surviving or remaining party to
such thing or contract, or any other person whose interest shall be adverse to the said
right of such deceased . . . be a competent witness to any matter occurring before
the death of said party...
9. The appropriate federal statute provides, "That in actions by or against executors, administrators, or guardians, in which judgment may be rendered for or against
them, neither party shall be allowed to testify against the other as to any transaction
with or statement by thd testator, intestate, or ward, unless called to testify thereto by
the opposite party or required to testify thereto by the court." REv. STAT. § 858 (1878),
28 U. S. C. A. § 631 (1928).
io. Hormer v. Gwynne, ii Fed. Cas. No. 6,075 (C. C. D. Ohio, 1851). There is
little authority on this subject I WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 5 at 201, § 6c: "Under
rule 43, the 'rules of Evidence heretofore applied in the courts of the United States on
the hearing of sits in equity' form the second choice to control. But where are these
rules to be found? How vain will be the search for them has been shown ante, § 6.
This part of Rule 43 seems to have little prospect of service."
See also i BATas, FEDERAL EQurry PRocmtmE (igoi) 441.
ii. "When a justification of the rule is attempted, it consists either of the mechanical repetition of the maxim, 'If death has closed the lips of the one party, the policy
of the law is to close the lips of the other' [Louis v. Easton, 5o Ala. 47o, 471 (1873)],
or of an elaboration of the evils thought to be guarded against:
The law in the exception to the privilege to testify was intended to prevent an
undue advantage on the part of the living over the dead, who cannot confront the
survivor, or give his version of the affair. . . . The temptation to falsehood and
concealment in such cases is considered too great to allow the surviving party to
testify in his own behalf . . . [Owens v. Owens, i4 W. Va. 88, 95 (1878)].
The implications of this argument are obvious: (i) the number of persons who will
perjure themselves . . . is so great that we are justified in barring from the witness stand all those who have honest claims . . . thus making proof of the honest
matter difficult and often impossible, (2) those dishonest survivors will be such consummate liars that cross-examination will be powerless to expose them, and (3) the
court and the jury will be incompetent to weigh the credibility of such persons' testimony." Callahan and Ferguson, Evidence and the New Federal Rides of Civil Procedure (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 194, 198.
Morgan, The Code of Evidence Proposed by the American Law Institute (94)
27 A. B. A. J. 587, "All such statutes are based on the fear of perjury and are quite as
ineffective to prevent it as was the common law rule which disqualified parties to an
action and all others financially interested in the action. In the notorious cases in New
York and California, where false claims for large sums have been presented against
the estates of decedents, these statutes have never hindered the claimant from introducing evidence. . . . At each crucial interview one or more of the claimant's trusted
friends have been conveniently present ...
Such testimony is just as difficult to test by cross-examination and to meet by
opposing evidence as is that of an interested survivor, and is usually subject to less
suspicion because of the apparent disinterestedness of the witness."
See also comments in note 23 of the opinion.
12. Pp. 7, 8.
13. Ibid.
14. See note 6.
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responding relaxation of the hearsay rule admit the decedent's statements
16
The tendency toward a more
as to facts through hearsay declarations.
and Wigmore predicted that,
marked
quite
rule
is
liberal position on this
"This remaining rule of disqualification is a relic of the past and is due to
disappear in the coming generation." 17

Labor Law-Labor Anti-Injunction Statute-Temporary Injunction Based on Ex Parte Proceedings-Striking employees picketed
Homestead Steel Works, congregated in groups up to 2oo at gates, forbade
admittance of maintenance employees in violation of local agreement.'
Common Pleas Court of Allegheny County, Pa., granted preliminary injunction based on ex parte affidavits, forbidding, inter alia, interference
2
Appeal alleged that under the
with access by acts or threats of force.
Pennsylvania Labor Anti-Injunction Act 3 the court had no power to issue
4
such preliminary injunction. Held (one justice dissenting), appeal dismissed, record remanded for immediate hearing, Act inapplicable in event
of breach of contract or mass picketing sufficient to constitute a seizure of
property. Carnegie-IllinoisSteel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America,
Local 1397, et al., 353 Pa. 420, 45 A. (2d) 857 (1946).
The case is. significant as a new and substantial limitation of the
Pennsylvania Labor Anti-Injunction Act. The scope of exceptions to the
15. MODEL CODE OF EviDENcE (x942) Rule IoI: "Every person is qualified to be
a witness as to any material matter unless the judge finds that
(a) the proposed witness is incapable of expressing himself concerning the
matter so as to be understood by the judge and jury, either directly or through
interpretation by one who can understand him, or
(b) the proposed witness is incapable of understanding the duty of a witness
to tell the truth."
6. Id. Rule 503: "Evidence of a hearsay declaration is admissible if the judge
finds that the declarant
(a) is unavailable as witness, or
(b) is present and subject to cross-examination."
17. WIcaroRE, LAW OF EVIDENCE (Student's Textbook 1933) 132.
i. Affidavits of A. H. MVfcGurk and W. E. Grouch state that they were kidnapped
by strikers. Other acts of violence and intimidation were alleged.
2. The injunction restrained defendants, etc., from:
"(a) Interfering with, hindering or obstructing the agents, servants and employees of the plaintiff engaged in' the performance of their work assignments . . .
by mass picketing, threats or acts of violence, force or show of force or other means
of intimidation or coercion ...
"(b) Preventing or attempting to prevent any person or persons, whether employees of the plaintiff or others, from freely entering or leaving the plaintiff's plants
and properties at said Homestead Steel works . . . by mass picketing ...
"(c) Conspiring, combining, confederating, agreeing or arranging with each other
or with any other person . . . to interfere with or injure the plaintiff in the conduct
of its lawful operations . . . or to interfere with, hinder or annoy any p erson
who may desire to enter or leave the said premises . . . by force or displays of
force or numbers, by threats, by acts of intimidation or violence, by the use of opprobrious epithets, jeers, suggestions of danger, taunts, or by any conduct which tends to
deprive any such . . . person of the free enjoyment of his legal rights or
."
access. ..
The injunction limited pickets to ten, in motion, spaced in a single line, at least
ten feet apart.
3. 1937, June 2, P. L. 1198, amended by 1939, June 9, P. L. 502; PA. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon, 1941) tit. 43, § 206.
4. Mr. Justice Jones dissented. Mr. Justice Drew and Mr. Justice Horace Stern
did not sit in this case.

19461

RECENT CASES

Act provided by the amendment of 1939 ' has been extended, and the Act
itself, which specifically forbids ex parte proceedings in cases of injunctive
relief," was held to be inapplicable to the dispute in question on ex parte
affidavits. The Act in its original form was closely patterned after the
Norris-LaGuardia Act 7 and would have denied the court the power to
issue an injunction in the instant case." The 1939 Amendment specified
that the Act would n 6 t apply in any ease of a labor dispute in violation of
a valid subsisting labor agreement or in case of seizure of property. 9 The
court below stated that the case is one arising from a labor dispute, but
held the Act inapplicable, relying on the breach of a local agreement to
admit personnel as being in disregard of a valid subsisting labor agreement. Mr. Justice Jones disagreed sharply with this portion of the decision
on the basis that the agreement in question was purely local, not with the
pleaded bargaining agent, and not the sort of labor agreement contemplated
by the Amendment of 1939.10 The majority opinion laid greater emphasis
on the alleged mass picketing as a seizure or holding of property." If
either the breach of agreement or seizure had been proved in accordance
with the procedure prescribed by the Act, the court would have had the
power to issue the injunction.12 The court below, however, held that the
bill and injunction affidavits removed the case from all provisions of the
Act, thereby avoiding the prohibition of the Act against ex parte proceedings. In effect, this question was thereby settled before it afose. The
language of the Act permits such an interpretation, but once established,
it may be extended almost indefinitely so as to vitiate the Act.'3 The
3. PA.

STAT. ANN.

(Purdon, 1941) tit. 43, § 2o6d.

6. § 9 of Act, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1941) tit. 43, § 2o6i.
7. 47 STAT. 70 (1932),

29 U. S. C. §§ 101-115.

8. Dissenting opinion states that counsel for complainant admitted that under the

Act of 1937, standing alone, the court would be without jurisdiction or power. See
Lipoff v. United Foodworkers Industrial Union, 33 D. & C. 599 (Pa. 1938), noted
(1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 546.
9. The 1939 Revision reads: "Provided, however, that this act shall not apply in

any case"(a) Involving a labor dispute . . . which is in disregard of a valid subsisting labor agreement arrived at between an employer and the representatives designated
or selected by the employees for the puitpose of collective bargaining...
"(d) Where in the course of a labor dispute . . . employees seize, hold, damage or destroy the plant, equipment, machinery. .

io. Mr. Justice Jones pointed out that the agreement was purely local, was not

subsisting at the time the dispute
been called for a subsequent date,
entered into by the International
below relied entirely on breach of

arose, was not arrived at until after the strike had
was a consequence of the dispute, and had not been
Union, the pleaded bargaining agent. The court
the agreement in holding that the case was affected

by the 1939 amendment.
ii. The Chief Justice stated, "Forcibly to deny an owner of property or his agents
and employees access to that property . . . is in practical and legal effect a seizure
or holding of that property. Such a lawless seizure of property no government worthy
of the name will tolerate or condone."
12. No question of freedom of speech is raised. The court below cited Milkwagon
Drivers v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287 (1940). U. S. Supreme Court distinguished right of picketing and of access to places picketed, quoting from correspondence of American Civil Liberties Union.
Injunction, apart from Labor Anti-Injunction Act, cited supra n. 3, is within
the equitable powers of the courts of Common Pleas, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1941),
tit. 17, § 281.
13. Procedure in instant case left small grounds for criticism as the defendants
had notice, the appeal was prompt, ii days elapsing between injunction and opinion
of the Supreme Court, and immediate hearing was directed. If however, the Act is
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value of the property involved,14 the certainty and extent of impending
injury 15 and the extreme conduct of the strikers probably convinced the
court that no other result should be reached. The protection of property
resulting from the decision is admittedly desirable, but the means by which
it was reached are all too siggestive of the reasoning in the Federal courts
which made the injunction provisions of the Clayton Act ineffective.' 6 The
result of the decision has already been felt in Pennsylvania, 17 and will very
possibly affect other states.' 8 A solution to the dilemma of preserving both
the protection to property which is afforded by speedy injunctive process
and the regulation to prevent abuse of the injunction in labor disputes will
undoubtedly remain a field for legislative ingenuity.
inapplicable in its entirety, there is no guaranty that subsequent procedures will be so
fair, and injunction may be issued as temporary yet continue indefinitely.
An additional ground for criticism, and one which may be of far-reaching consequences is the general, all-inclusive phraseology of the injunction, see n. 2, supra, n.
16, infra. A sound comment is found on this subject in FRANCKFUYRTER AND GREENE,
THE LABOR INJUNCtION (New York, 1930): "A 'threat' may be a -warning of violence; it may also be merely a warning that one will do a legally permissible act.
'Coercion' may be physical compulsion; it may also imply merely the exertion of
economic pressure. . . . A vocabulary so freighted with ambiguity easily lends
itself to a fictitious issue, by confounding assumed conduct with the real conduct whose
justifiability is in question. Unwittingly a court may be pronouncing judgment upon
the implications of a label, instead of weighing the elements of an industrial conflict
as it actually transpired."
14. $120,000,000 together with $9o,oooooo worth of property owned by the Reconstruction Finance Corp.
15. Freezing steam and water lines, the necessity for keeping fires in furnaces,
and other maintenance incidental to steel manufacture necessitated constant services of
personnel to avoid extensive and immediate injury.
I6. Section 20 of the Clayton Act, 1914, c. 323. 29 U. S. C. § 52, prohibited use
of injunction in labor disputes. By a series of decisions the scope of this provision
of the act was restricted so as to become almost wholly ineffective. Hitchman Coal
and Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229 (1917) permitted injunctions to enforce "yellow dog contracts"; Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921)
interpreted labor disputes to apply only to the immediate employer; Bedford Cut Stone
Co. v. Journeyman Stone Cutters Assn., 274 U. S. 37 (1927)

enjoined conspiracy to

refrain from work on non-union product. See Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit. supra
note 13, p. 165 et seq.; E. E. CUmmINS, THE LABOR PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES
(2d ed. 1935), P. 482 et seq.
17. Four decisions have been made in Pennsylvania since the instant case, all on
the mass picketing issue. In Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. United Electric Workers,
94 Pittsburgh Legal Journal gr (1946) the Common Pleas Court of Allegheny Co.
refused motion for preliminary injunction in ,case of mass picketing where union permitted agreed list of personnel access to the plant, on the ground that the Court had
no jurisdiction. On appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court this case was reversed,
Mr. Justice Jones dissenting. The Carnegie-IllinoisSteel Case was expressly affirmed,
Philadelphia Legal Intelligencer, Mar. 13, 1946, p. I, col. 3. Two injunctions prohibiting mass picketing have been issued by Common Pleas Court of Philadelphia County: Westinghouse Electrical Supply Co. v. Local 1O7 United Electridal Radio and
Machine Workers Union, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Feb. i9, 1946, p. I, cols. 3, 4,
and General Electric Co. v. Local 119 United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers
Union, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Feb. 25, 1946, p. I, cols. I, 2. Both cases have produced wide public interest, the former resulted in picketing of the judges residence
and the latter in widespread disorder. It is noted that hearings were held in both
Philadelphia Cases, but not in the Allegheny County case.
I8. A partial solution is provided by statutory limitation of the duration of preliminary injunctions to five days, with requirements for posting of bond by petitioner.
ANN. CODE MD. (Flack, 1939) Art. IOO, No. 69; N. J. STAT. ANN. (West, 1939)
2:29-77; ANN. LAWS MASS. (Michie, Supp. x944) vol. 7, c. 214, § 9A. Authorities
are collected in Current Legislative and Judicial Restrictions on State Labor Injunction Acts (1944) 53 YALE L. J. 553.
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Libel and Slander-Publication-Limitation of Actions-Alleged
libel appeared in Life magazine dated January 17, 1944. The proceedings
were begun on January 17, 1945, the Statute of Limitatioris in cases of

libel and slander being one year.' The undisputed facts revealed that the
composing, printing and distribution, both by mail to subscribers and by
shipping to distributors, was completed by January 14, 1944, which was
the general release date (a Friday) of the magazine dated January 17,
1944 (a Monday).
No copies were printed after January 14, but miscellaneous copies, for the purpose of replacing copies not received, or received in a damaged condition, for the filling of new or renewal subscriptions which had been received within a day or two after January 14, 1944,
and for complying with requests for "back number" copies, were mailed
out.2 The complaint alleged that the libelous matter was published on
January 17, 1944, one year to the day prior to the date upon which the

proceedings were instituted.

The defendant contended that the date of

publication was prior to January 17, 1944. Held, the cause of action
accrued prior to January 17, 1944, and is therefore barred by the Statute

of Limitations. Hartmann v. Time, Inc., Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Mar.
7, 1946, P. I,col. 5 (E. D. Pa.).
It is a doctrine of venerable lineage, in both the English and American
courts, that each time a libel is brought to the attention of a third person
a new publication has occurred which constitutes a fresh tort giving rise
to a new cause of action.3 Of this principle the court was well aware.
The opinion quoted almost in its entirety comment (b) of section 578 of
the RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF ToRTs, 4 and acknowledged that this
was the law as applied for generations. Kalodner, District Judge, then
stated, "There is discernable, however, to a marked degree, a reluctance
12,

1. Section i of the Act of March 27, 1713, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1941) tit.
§ 31, provides that actions on the case for words (later extended by Sec. 35 of the

Act of April 25, 185o, to all cases of slander and libel), must be brought "within one
year next after the words spoken, and not after."
2. Life, after being composed and edited in New York, was sent to a firm in
Chicago which completed preparation of two sets of plates on January 9,1944. One
set was retained by the: Chicago firm and the other sent to a press in Philadelphia.
Life is distributed by mail and over newsstands.

Except for the late subscription

copies, the replacement copies and those sent in response to "back number" requests,
no part of the issue was mailed from Chicago after 7 A. M. (C. W. T.) on January
14, 1944, and no part at all was mailed from Philadelphia after January 13, 1944.

Shipping of newsstand copies to independent distributors was completed by January
13, 1944, in both Philadelphia and Chicago. The 3,900,000 copies were almost entirely
on newsstands and in the hands of subscribers by the general release date of Friday,
January 14, 1944.
3. Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 14 Q. B. 185, 117 Eng. Rep. 75 (1849) ; Underwood v. Smith, 93 Tenn. 687, 27 S. W. 1oo8 (1894); RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938),
§ 578. The cases supporting this general proposition are legion, but comparatively
few of them concern themselves with a situation in which there has occurred subsequent small-scale distribution of extra copies of the original issue, as in the instant
case. Where the reprinting was that of a later edition of the same issue of a newspaper, it was held that the entire issue gave rise to but one cause of action and that
the subsequent editions went only to the question of damages. Galligan v. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n, 25 Misc. Rep. 355, 54 N. Y. S. 471 (1898).
4. "Each time a libelous article is brought to the attention of a third person, a
new publication has occurred, and each publication is a separate tort. Thus, each
time a libelous book or paper or magazine is sold, a new publication has taken place
which, if the libel is false and unprivileged, will support a separate action for damages
against the printer. So, too, each time a libelous article is reprinted or redistributed,
a new publication and fresh tort is committed." RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938), § 578,
comment (b). It may be noted that none of the cases cited in support of this comment in EXP.ANATORY NOTES (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1935) § 1o2I, are in point with
the instant case or concern a similar situation.
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among the modern courts to apply that law when confronted with a controversy involving large distributions of printed matter such as are made
by present day newspaper and magazine publishers." The opinion went
on to state that one issue of a newspaper or magazine gives rise to one
cause of action, there being one publication, from which the Statute of
Limitations begins to run, and the later mailing of miscellaneous copies, as
here occurred, does not amount to a new publication.- It seems clear that
the old rule is not subject to practicable application in a society dependent
on mass dissemination of printed matter without modification. The entire
process by which a given issue of a publication is composed, printed and
distributed is now considered as one publication,6 and if subsequent, piecemeal distribution, of a type in accord with the general practice in the
trade, takes place, as here, it does not, in the modern view, give rise to a
new cause of action.7 However, the extent to which a publisher can go
in the dissemination of a libel after the so-called "one publication" is still
to be defined.8 Orf the other hand, the publisher, having published a libel,
should not then be given an immunity to continue to increase and aggravate
his tort.9 To the argument that the old rule tends to nullify the Statute
of Limitations it may be said that if the publisher does nothing further
after his original tort the statute will run 10 and he shall be clear in a year,
and if he continues to disseminate a libel, he does, in fact, continue to
wrong the person defamed and should not be permitted to plead his own
original wrong to gain immunity from suit.
5. Means v. McFadden Publications, Inc.. 25 F. SupP. 993 (S. D. N. Y., 1939);
Backus v. Look, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 662 (S. D. N. Y., 1941) ; Cannon v. Time, Inc., 39
F. Supp. 66o (S. D. N. Y., 1939).
15.At precisely what point in this lengthy process the publication takes place is
not certain. The court in the instant case encountered a situation in which the line
was relatively easy to draw at that point in which the presses came to a halt and the
vast bulk of the issue was in the hands of independent circulatory agencies or in the
mail. If a reduced production on a stand-by press had continued beyond general release date to supply what is known to the trade as "fill-ins," as is sometimes the case,
a different result is conceivable. The general release date is the most likely and most
frequently used point by the courts, one court having phrased it when the periodical
"goes into circulation"; Brian v. Harper, 144 La. 585, 80 So. 885 (1919).
7. Of course, the number of copies circulated is taken into consideration in assessing damages: Chambers v. Philadelphia Inquirer, 14 D. & C. (Pa.) 421 (1930) ; Reed
v. The Patriot Co., 35 D. & C. (Pa.) 466 (1939).

8. One nascent, but as yet inchoate view, would distinguish on the basis of whether
or not the defendant's conduct was "passive," if he does not reprint, for instance
[Backus v. Look, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 662 (S. D. N. Y., 1941), and Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, Inc., 254 App. Div. 211, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 64o (938), aff'd per cur.
279 N. Y. 716, 18 N. E. (2d) 676 (1939)], but simply makes available back numbers in
accord with current trade practices. Prout v. Real Detective Publishing Co., Inc.
(N. Y. S. Ct.), ioi N. Y. L. J. 829:1 (1939).

9. A recent, effective reaffirmation of the general principle of the tradintional rule
and a possible indication that the view of the Federal Courts in New York may not
be followed elsewhere, is to be found in Winrod v. McFadden Publications, Inc., 62
F. Supp. 249 (N. D. Ill.. 1945). in which the court stated that if the rule were followed that mailing out single copies after original distribution is part of the original
publication and not separately actionable, "the publisher could with impunity print
large numbers of extra copies of an issue containing libelous matter, retain them on
hand, and from time to time through the years mail them. . . . The original publication may have been forgotten, but the continuous mailing . . . would reiterate
and emphasize the libel . . . cause more damage than the original publication... "
IO. In any case, the publisher is not responsible for subsequent sales over the
course of years by third parties who may have retained copies of the original issue.
Winrod v. McFadden Publications, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 249 (N. D. Ill., 1945).
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Taxation-Federal Estate Tax-Effect of Grantor's Power to
Terminate-Decedent H, in 1936, created three separate, irrevocable
trusts for each of his three sons, who were given a one-third beneficial
interest in a common fund of stock. H reserved to himself the power to
terminate any of the trusts and distribute the corpus to the beneficiaries
then entitled to receive it. If the trust was not terminated it was to continue until the issue of the three sons reached 21. The grantor, by electing
the moment at which he exercised his power to terminate, or by not exercising it at all, could determine which of the three sons would receive the
corpus, or whether any of them would receive it.1 This trust was not
included in decedent's gross estate for tax purposes and the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue imposed a deficiency against the estate. To review
a decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals, 2 affirming a decision of the
Tax Court,3 the Commissioner brought certiorari. Held, reversed. The
reservation by the grantor to himself of a power to terminate any of the
trusts and distribute the principle to beneficiaries then entitled to receive
it placed the trust within the terms of the statute including in decedent's
gross estate for estate tax purposes property subject to decedent's power
to "alter, amend or revoke." 4 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Holmes' Estate, 66 Sup. Ct. 257 (1946).
Since the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1926, the Federal revenue
legislation has included in the gross estate the value of any property "which
the decedent has at any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise, where
the enjoyment thereof was subject . . . to change through the exercise
of a power . . . to alter, amend or revoke." 5 A 1936 6 revision 7 added,

among other things, the words "or terminate" to this provision,8 which

i. The surviving issue of each son was to take his share unconditionally if over
and as a beneficiary until then. The share of a son who died without issue went
pro rata to the surviving sons or per stirpes to their issue; if two of the three sons
21

were to die without issue, the surviving son or his issue was to take the whole. If all
the sons should die without issue, the remainder was to go to the grantor's wife or to
her heirs-at-law. The income might be withheld by the grantor to accumulate for the
benefit of the beneficiary in question. At any time the grantor might exercise his one

reserved power to terminate and the corpus would go to the beneficiaries who, at that

moment, were entitled t6 receive it. The trust was, in any case, to terminate upon the
expiration of 21 years after the death of the last survivor of the three sons.
2. 148 F. (2d) 740 (C. C. A. 5th, '945).
3. 3 T. C. 571 (944).
4. Revenue Act of 1926, §.302 (d), 44 STAT. 71, as amended by Revenue Act of
1934, § 401, 48 STAT. 752, and Revenue Act of 1936, § 8o5 (a), 49 STAT. 1744. The
provision is now contained in INT. REv. CowE, § 81I (d).

5. Since the Revenue Act of 1916, whose framers were not unaware of the likelihood of attempts to avoid the tax through the creation of inter vivos trusts, many ingenious devices have been employed to avoid the effect of the act, amendments and
revisions of which have attempted to keep pace with the multiform circumventions
contrived by taxpayers.

6. Note that in the instant case the trust instrument was executed in 1935.
7. Supra, note 4.
8. IN=TERNAL REVENUE CODE, § 81I, Gross Estate. "The value of the gross estate
of the decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of death of all
property, etc. . . . (d) Revocable transfers-(i) TRANSFERS ArI-R JUNE 22,

1936. To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time

made a transfer . . . by trust or otherwise, where the enjoyment thereof was sub-

ject at the date of his death to any change through the exercise of a power (in whatever capacity exercisable) by the decedent alone or by the decedent in conjunction

with any other person (without regard to when or from what source the decedent
acquired such power), to alter, amend, revoke or terminate, or where any such power
is relinquished in contemplation of death; (2) TRANSFERS ON OR PRIOR TO JUNE 22,
1936. To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time
made a transfer . . . by trust or otherwise, where the enjoyment thereof was subject at the date of his death to any change through the exercise of a Power by the

338

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

addition was, in the instant case, held to have been merely declaratory of
existing law, 9 a viewpoint taken in the report of the House Committee. 0
A lengthy series of cases have passed upon the tax, eligibility of trusts
wherein various powers have been reserved by the grantor.1
Justice
Rutledge, in delivering the majority opinion in the case at hand, rejected
the argument that the settlor had retained only the power to accelerate in
time the enjoyment of the beneficial interests brought into being as vested
interests by the trusts,12 pointing out that a power had been retained to
terminate contingencies with the effect of making certain that the beneficiary taking the corpus would have it, rather than others to whom it
might inure if termination were longer deferred. Hence the very right of
decedent alone or by the decedent in conjunction with any othez person, to alter, amend
or revoke, or'etc. . . . Except in the case of transfers made after June 22, 1936, no
interest of the decedent of which he has made a transfer shall be included in the gross
estate under paragraph (I)unless it is includible under this paragraph."
The applicable regulation is sec. 81.20 of Treasury Regulations IO5.
9.Although it has been held that when the power in question is vested in the
settlor alone, the application of a later enacted statute is valid, Porter v. Commissioner,
288 U. S. 436, 53 Sup. Ct 451 (933), it has also been held that where the revocation is 'joint with 'the settlor and adverse parties a later passed statute cannot be
applied without violation of the 5th Amendment. Helvering v. Helmholtz, 296 U. S.
93, 56 Sup. Ct. 68 (1935) ; Nichols v. Coolidge et al., 274 U. S. 531, 47 Sup. Ct. 7IO
(1927).
But see, Third Natl Bank and Tr. Co. v. White, 45 F. (2d) 9Ii (D. C. D.
Mass. 1930), affirmned per curiam, 58 F. (2d)
287 U. S. 577, 53 Sup. Ct. 290 (1932).

1085 (C. C. A. 1st, 1930), cert. denied,

Io.The House Committee Report stated, "Another change made in subsection (a)
of section 2o6, now section 8iid, has been expressly to include a power to terminate
along with power to alter, amend or revoke . . . since in substance a power to
terminate is the equivalent of a power to revoke, this question should be set at rest.
Express provision has been made to that effect and it is believed that it is declaratory
of existing law." CONF. REP. No. 3068, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (i936) I9; H. R. REP.
No. 2818, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 9-io.
ii. It has been held that a degree of control sufficient to make-the trust part of
the gross estate for tax purposes has been retained, regardless of the grantor's incapacity to recapture [Porter v.'Commissioner, 288 U. S. 436, 53 S. Ct. 451 (1933) ; where
only the income would ever be taken by the beneficiaries unless the grantor exercised
his power of termination (Mellon et al. v. Driscoll, 117 F. (2d) 477 (C. C. A. 3rd,
194), cert. denied, 313 U. S. 579, 6I Sup. Ct. 1100 (941)
relied upon by the Commissioner in the Tax Court in the instant case but distinguished by the court] ; and
in cases where power was retained merely to shift relative proportions to be received
by fixed beneficiaries [Guggenheim v. Helvering, ii7 F. (2d) 469 (C. C. A. 2d,
1941)]; or where only income could be shifted among them [Hoblitzelle et al. v.
United States, 3 F. Supp. 331 (Ct Cl., 1933)] ; although no power to add new beneficiaries was reserved [Chickering v. Commissioner, 1m8 F. (2d) 254 (C. C. A. ist,
194)].

The statute now specifically provides that the-powers enumerated are to be considered regardless of in what capacity they are exercisable, but previous to this addition Union Trust Co. of Pittsburgh v. Driscoll, 138 F. (2d) 152 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1943),
cert. deniied, 321 U. S.764, 64 Sup. Ct. 521 (1944), and Welch v. Terhune, 126 F. (2d)
695 (C. C. A. Ist, 1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 644, 63 Sup. Ct. 37 (1942), held that

where power was reserved by grantor to alter the interest of the beneficiaries in the
capacity of trustee the trust was taxable. However, White v. Poor et al., 296 U. S.
98, 56 Sup. Ct. 66 (1936), in which the grantor resigned as trustee and was subsequently reappointed by the beneficiaries upon the resignation of her successor, held
that this was not a power reserved to her by the trust agreement and such power did
not render the trust taxable under the statute. It was this case which precipitated the
hurried 1936 amendment to the statute by Congress a few hours prior to adjournment.
12. The lower court, deciding in the taxpayer's favor, said that the grantor could
not alter, amend or revoke, he could merely terminate and thereby accelerate the
time that the beneficiaries might enjoy the corpus, that the corpus had already been
given to them in the trust indenture which was, at the time it was made, a completed
gift and, as such, then subject to the gift tax, but not now subject to the estate tax.
3 T. C. 571 (1944).
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enjoyment'- was affected by the grantor's power of termination. According to the Supreme Court's interpretation, the reserved power in this
case was more than a mere power to accelerate the time of enjoyment of
a vested interest by termination of the trust; it amounted to a power to
shift beneficiaries. Thus the decision is in line with,prior cases. 14 The
question therefore is left open as to the taxability of a trust wherein the
grantor's power to terminate actually amounts only to a power to accelerate
the enjoyment of a vested interest. In finding that the addition of "or
terminate" to the statute was declaratory of existing law (the previously
existing law having been applied in reference to power to shift beneficial
interests), the question also remains as to the effect, if any, of the 1936
amendment.

Taxation-Judicial Review of Tax Court Decisions-The Commissioner assessed deficiencies against two corporate taxpayers on the
grounds that deductions which they claimed as payments of interest on
indebtedness were not allowable because the payments were in reality
dividends. The Tax Court refused to sustain the Commissioner's assessment in one case ' and affirmed it in the other. 2 The lower court reversed
the Tax Court in the first case 3 and sustained it in the latter. 4 Held,
(three judges dissenting) " the Tax Court decision in both cases affirmed.
It was reasonably possible for the Tax Court to conclude that the payments in one instance were interest to creditors and dividends to stockholders in the other, and this determination is entitled to finality. John
Kelley Co. v. Comn'r of Internal Revenue and Talbot Mills v. Same, 66
Sup. Ct.

299
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These cases present an interesting application of the rule limiting
judicial review 6 of Tax Court decisions first introduced in the Dobson
13. "'Enjoyment' and 'enjoy' as used in these and similar statutes, are not terms
of art, but connote substantial present economic benefit rather than the technical vesting of title or estates," Rutledge, J., in the instant case, p. 26o.
14. Supra note ii.
i. John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, i T. C. 457 (1943). The Kelley Co. pursuant to a reorganization issued debenture bearer bonds to stockholders, partly (about
four-fifths) in exchange for preferred stock and the balance for cash. Interest was
non-cumulative and payable, if earned, at a specified rate. Debentures matured in
twenty years, but payment was subordinated to all other creditors.
2. Talbot Mills v. Commissioner, 3 T. C. 95 (i944).
The facts here differed
from those in the Kelley Co. case in the following particulars. The instruments evidencing the indebtedness were registered notes issued wholly in exchange for capital stock.
Interest, which was cumulative, was payable at a variable rate depending on earnings
but could be deferred until maturity. The notes could be subordinated to claims of
other creditors by action of the Board of Directors.
3. 146 F. (2d) 466 (C. C. A. 7th, i944).
4. 146 F. (2d) 8og (C. C. A. 1st, 1944).
5. Justice Black concurred in the result in the Talbot Mills case, but was of the
opinion that the Circuit Court of Appeals should have been sustained in the Kelley Co.
case. Justice Burton concurred in the result in the Kelley Co. case but dissented
from the result in the Talbot Mills case. Justice Rutledge wrote a dissenting opinion,
in which he disagreed with the majority's views that the determinations of the Tax
Court were not reviewable and in which he stated that the, judgments of the Circuit
Court of Appeals should be affirmed in both cases. Justice Jackson took no part.
6. The basis for review of Tax Court decisions is set 'forth in INT. REv. CODE,
§ 1141 c) (i) : "To affirm, modify or reverse. Upon such review, such courts shall
have power to affirm or, if the decision of the Board is not in accordance with law,
to modify or to reverse the decision of the Board, with or without remanding the case
for a rehearing, as justice may require."
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case.7 When the Dobson case had been decided, it was not clear just how
great a departure was being made from hitherto established principles of
review in tax cases.8 However, it was apparent that the Court had tried
to impart a degree of finality to Tax Court decisions similar to that enjoyed by other administrative tribunals; 9 such treatment had been noticeably lacking in previous pronouncements of the Court. 10 There were suggestions in the Dobson case that the Court was greatly restricting the
scope of appellate review in tax cases,"' and that henceforth the decisions
of the Tax Court, in cases where the pertinent statute contains no definite
rule, "must be respected on appeal if it is rooted in a reasonable legal
interpretation regardless of whether the appellate court would subscribe
to that interpretation as an original proposition." 12 It was this intimation
7. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 489 (1943), rehearing denied, 321 U. S. 231

(1944). In this case several taxpayers had sold shares of-stock at a loss, which was
allowed for income tax purposes and later recovered part of the purchase price in settlement of a suit for fraud. The Commissioner assessed deficiencies on the ground
that recovery was taxable income. The Tax Court reversed the Commissioner and
determined there was no taxable income except to the extent that the loss claimed
previously had offset taxable income. The Circuit- Court of Appeals reversed the
Tax Court. The Supreme Court in reinstating the Tax Court decision said that the
application of the "tax benefit theory" in such a situation was a matter of proper
accounting practice on which the determination of the Tax Court was final. But cf.
Virginian Hotel Corp. v. Helvering, 319 U. S. 523 (1943), wherein the Court con-

sidered the application of the "tax benefit theory" a matter of law for appellate decision. A reconciliation of the Dobson and Virginian Hotel cases is suggested in Note
(1944) 29 CORN. L. Q. 515.
8. Although the earlier cases drew confused distinctions between questions of fact
and questions of law, they were in agreement on the proposition that legal questions
were properly the subject of judicial review. Merthant's Nat. Bank of Boston v.
Commissioner, 320 U. S. 256 (1943); Virginian Hotel Corp. v. Helvering, 319 U. S.
523 (943); Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U. S. 322 (1943); Wilmington
Trust Co. v. Helvering, 316 U. S. x64 (1942); Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300
U. S. 481 (1937) ; Helvering v. Rankin, 295 U. S. 123 (1935).

q. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 489 at 494. The Board of Tax Appeals
(now the Tax Court) was established as "an independent agency in the executive
branch of the Government." Revenue Act of 1924, § 9oo (k). However, the Tax
Court is a court in name and in fact. It is not a policy-making body. This is made
clear in the report of the House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means,
upon the Revenue Act of 1926. The committee stated: "In the view of the committee,
the decisions of the Board (of Tax Appeals) are judicial and not legislative or administrative determinations. . . . The imposition upon the court of the duty of reviewing judicial decision, such as those of the Board, is not the imposition of a nonjudicial
duty, ......
Such a review of a judicial as distinguished from a legislative or administrative determination may be had as to either questions of law or of fact. The
proposed procedure, however, for reasons of policy and not of law, limits court review
solely to questions of law as heretofore described. . . " H. R. REP. No. I, 69th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1925), 1939-1 (2) CUM. BULL. 315, 328, 329.
io. Compare Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U. S. 322 (I943) ; Bogar-

dus v. Commissioner, 302 U. S. 34 (x937) ; Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300 U. S.
481 (1937); and Helvering v. Rankin, 295 U. S. 123 (1935), with Gray v. Powell,
314 U. S. 402 (941)

; NLRB v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 309 U. S. :96 (940)

;

Rochester Telephone Corp. v. U. S., 307 U. S. 125 (ig3g) ; and Shields et aI. v. Utah,
Idaho Central R. R. Co., 305 U. S. 177 (1938).
3I. Hints of this impending break with tradition can be gleaned from Gray v.
Powell, 314 U. S. 402 (194), the dissenting opinion in Helvering v. American Dental
Co., 318 U. S. 322, 331 (I943), and to some extent in the dissenting opinion in
Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U. S. 34, 44 (i937). However, in Morgan Stanley &
Co. v. S. E. C., 126 F. (2d) 325, 331 (C. C. A. 2d. 1942) it was stated that Gray v.
Powell did not destroy full review of questions of law.
12. Paul, Dobson v. Commissioner, The Strange Ways of Law and Fact (1944)
57 HARv. L. REv. 753, 778.
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of radical change which created confusion in the lower courts, 13 and it soon
became apparent that the Supreme Court itself was not certain about what
it had done.1 4 Subsequently, finality was definitely denied to Tax Court
decisions in certain limited situations. The Dobson decision was founded
on the Court's confidence in the independence, ability, and expertness of
the Tax Court. 15 Hence, a Tax Court decision, when based on an erroneous belief that the law requires such a decision rather than on an
independent exercise of judgment, will not be allowed to stand.' 6 Similarly, since the district c6urts '7 nd the Court of Claims 's lack the expert
competency of the Tax Court, determinations by those courts in tax questions will not be accorded the same degree of finality. 9 Moreover, where
a question of law is involved, the determination of which does not require
the specialized experience of the Tax Court, e. g., the effect of a federal or
state statute on provisions of the Internal Revenue Code or the impact of
common law rules of property in the field of taxation, the appellate courts
13. Chenango Textile Corp. v. Commissioner, x48 F. (2d) 296 (C. C. A. 2d,
1945) (refused to sustain Tax Court determination that forgiveness of debt consti-

tuted income but sustained determination that certain legal fees were not deductible
as an ordinary and necessary expense) ; Thornley v. Commissioner, 147 F. (2d) 416
(C. C. A. 3rd, 1945) (resurrected the doctrine of mixed question of law and fact as
an excuse to review de iwvo the Tax Court's decision); Helvering v. Stormfeltz,
142 F. (2d) 985 (C. C. A. 8th, 1944) (reversed Tax Court determination that certain
property was held for the production of income) ; Smith v. Helvering, 141 F. (2d)
529 (App. D. C., 3944) (reversed Tax Court determination of year in which loss on
stock occurred) ; Central Nat. Bank of Cleveland v. Commissioner, 43 F. (2d) 352
(C. C. A. 6th, 1944) (refused to uphold Tax Court finding that income from short
term family trust was taxable to grantor) ; Repplier Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 340
F. (2d) 554 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1944) (sustained Tax Court's finding that an expenditure
was capital in nature and also Tax Court's method of computing gross and net income,
but rejected its conclusion that depreciation had not been "allowed" in prior years
where there was no tax benefit) ; Denholm and McKay Realty Co. v. Commissioner,
139 F. (2d) 545 (C. C. A. ist, i944) (refused to uphold Tax Court decision that payment by one corporation, pursuant to a guarantee, of the dividends on stock of another
corporation constituted income to the latter).
34. Dixie Pine Products Co. v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 516 (I944) ; Security
Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U. S. 281 (1944) ; Equitable Life Assur. Soc.
of U. S. v. Commissioner, 321 U. S. 56o (1944); Douglas v. Commissioner, 322 U. S.
275 (I944). After the decisions in the Dixie Pine Products and Security Flour Mills
cases had been handed down, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals was moved to grant
a rehearing in a case which it had previously disposed of on the basis of the Dobson
decision, Cooperstown Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F. (2d) 693 (1944), cert. denied,
323 U. S. 772 (1944). It is interesting to note that the Douglas case like the Dobson
case dealt with the application of the "Tax benefit theory," and of the six justices who
considered the bearing of the Dobson case on the issue, four decided against the determination of the Tax Court.
i5. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 489, 498-500 (944).
6. Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U. S. 467 (943).
The validity of this proposition is doubtful. If the Tax Court's determinations are of value because of that body's
ability, why should it not be permitted to select a decision of an appellate court which,
by reason of its expert competency, it feels governs the issue at hand? However, the
proposition was accepted in Chenango Textile Corp. v. Commissioner, 348 F. (2d) 296
(C. C. A. 2d, 1945), and Denholm and McKay- Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 139
F. (2d) 545 (C. C. A. 1st, x944), both cited supra note 13.
7. The jurisdiction of the district courts in tax cases is set forth in 28 U. S. C.
§41 (5)and 28 U. S. C. § 41 (20).
i8. 28 U. S. C. § 250 (1) is the basis of jurisdiction of the Court of Claims in tax
matters.
Ig. Compare Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U. S. 303 (1945), with Merrill v.
Fahs, 324 U. S. 308 (I945) ; but cf. Fidelity-Phila. Trust Co. et al., Executors v.
Rothensies, 324 U. S. 1o8 (1945), and Commissionr v. Estate of Field, 324 U. S. 113
(I945).

342

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 94

must exercise their own independent judgment on review.20 But these
-cases fell outside the scope of the Dobson decision; where the line would
be drawn when Tax Court competency was involved was still in doubt.
Then the Court announced that appellate review should not be exercised
in cases where the factual content is decisive and unique and the appellate
court is not able to state a principle of general applicability different than
that used by the Tax Court.21 In the Bingham Trust case 22 the Court
accepted these ideas of "factual content" and "principle of general applicability" as the only limitations on the review of tax cases and decisively
rejected the notion that Tax Court decisions should be final in all cases
where the issue called into play that body's expert competency. However,
the use to which this formula is put necessarily depends upon the attitude
with which each individual case is approached. 23 In these tax cases, the
Supreme Court's attitude toward the propriety of appellate review seems
to depend upon whether or not the particular Tax Court decision was
reasonable. 24 The instant cases, despite the emphasis placed on the factual
nature of the problem, merely indicate that the majority is not disturbed
by the conclusion reached by the Tax Court. 25 It seems clear that the
2o. Claridge Apartments Co. v. Commissioner, 323 U. S. 141 (944) (the effect
of provisions of the Bankruptcy Act) ; Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U. S. 44 (1944)
(the effect of Oklahoma Community Property Statute); Commissioner v. Disston,
325 U. S. 442 (1945). and Fondren et al. v. Commissioner, 324 U. S. 18 (1945)
(futre interests). However, in the latter case the court stated that what is a "future
interest" depends on donee's right to presently use, possess, or enjoy the property, a
question of substantial economic benefit; although such a test would seem to be a matter for Tax Court application, the court proceeded to examine the question on its merits,
after which it upheld the Tax Court. See Justice Frankfurter concurring in Trust of
Bingham et al. v. Commissioner, 325 U. S. 365, 377, 381 (1945), discussed infra note 22.
21. Commissioner v

Scottish American Investment Co., Ltd., 323 U. S. 124

(1944). This is the suggested approach contained in Paul, supra.note 12 at 828-832,
840, and in Brown, Fact and Law in Judicial Review (1943) 56 HARV. L. REv. 899,
905, 911.

22. Trust of Bingham et al. v. Commissioner, 325 U. S. 365 (1945). Here trustees paid in connection with the administration of the trust certain legal fees. The
Commissioner refused to allow deduction of these fees and assessed a deficiency, which
the Tax Court did not sustain. The Circuit Court reversed the Tax Court. The
Supreme Court in upholding the Tax Court stated that whether the trust property
was held for the production of income was a question of interpretation of the statute;
a proper matter for judicial review. Justice Frankfurter in a dissenting opinion (in
which Justices Roberts and Jackson joined) stated that the whole question was one
which called into play the expertness of the Tax Court whose conclusions in the matter were not open to review.
23. See Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 489, 501.
24. Cf. Commissioner v. Flowers, 66 Sup. Ct. 250 (1946) ; Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U. S. 442 (i945); Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U. S. 177 (1945); Webre
Steib Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 324 U. S. 164 (1945) ; Commissioner v. Estate of
Field, 324 U. S. 113 (945) ; McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U. S. 57 (I944) ; Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U. S. 281 (1944).
. 25. Instant cases at 302, 304. This becomes even clearer when the instant cases
are compared with Commissioner v. Tower, 14 U. S. L. WEEK 4200 (1946) and Lusthaus v. Commissioner, 14 U. S. L. WEEK 4203 (1946). In the Tower and Lusthaus
cases the Tax Court had decided that certain income from a family partnership was
taxable wholly to the husband rather than to the husband and wife in accordance
with their partnership interests. In upholding .the Tax Court, the Supreme Court
stated that whether there was a partnership for tax purposes was a question for the
Tax Court to decide free from review. It is interesting to note that Justice Black,
who dissented in the instant cases wrote the majority opinion in the Tower and Lusthaus cases, in which Justice Burton. another dissenter in the instant cases, joined.
Justice Reed, who wrote the majority opinion in the instant cases, wrote the dissenting
opinion in the Tower and Lusthaus cases, in which Chief Justice Stone joined. Justice
Rutledge concurred in the result in'the Tower and Luesthaus cases, but did not agree
on the question of review.
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Court has not succeeded in reducing the number of appeals from Tax
Court decisions thereby bringing about uniformity and elimination of delay
action appears to offer the only real
in our tax system.2 6 2Legislative
7
solution to the problem.

Taxation-Recoupment of Refund Barred by Statute of Limitations-Taxpayer sued to recover income tax paid in 1935 on a refund,
received in that year, of excise taxes illegally collected from 1923 to 1926.
Excise tax payments had also been made under protest for the years 1919
to 1922; but refund of these payments was barred by the lapse of time.
Taxpayer claimed that when being pressed to pay income tax on refund
of some of these payments, it can recoup the amount of the I919-1922
taxes it was illegally compelled to pay, even though it could not sue for
them. Held recovery allowed. § 6o8 and § 609 of the Revenue Act of
19281 do not prevent a taxpayer from setting up recoupment of a barred
refund as a defense against an existing tax liability when, as here, both
the claim for refund and the tax liability arise out of the same transaction.
Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Rothensies, 152 F. (2d) 521 (C. C. A. 3rd,
1945) 2
In Bull v. United States," a Supreme Court statement that recoupment
will always override the statute of limitations indicates one solution of the
interpretation of § 607, § 6o8, and § 6o9. However, this would result in
the repeal of these sections in all cases where the same transaction is involved. Moreover, this broad suggestion was not followed in McEachern
v. Rose 4 where the government was not permitted to recoup a barred
26. It is doubtful that the Court could accomplish this even if the minority opinion
in the Bingham Trust case, supra note 22, were accepted, because the drawing of a
line between those matters in which the appellate courts are believed to be expert and
those in which the Tax Court has the advantage would be as difficult as the distinction
to be drawn between law and fact; see Brown, supra note 21 at 927.
27. A Court of Tax Appeals is the remedy suggested in Griswold, The Need for
a Court of Tax Appeals (1944) 57 H~av. L. REv. 1153.
i. Section 6o8, 45

STAT.

for,

INT. R v. C0 E § 3774: "A refund of any
. . . shall be considered erroneous-

874 (928),

portion of an internal revenue tax

made after the expiration of the period of limitation for filing claim there"(a)
If
.
.
.

Section 6o9, 45 STAT. 875 (1928), INT. REv. CODE § 3775: "(a) Any credit against
a liability in respect of any taxable year shall be void if any payment in respect of such
liability would be considered an overpayment under § 6o7.
"(b) A credit of an overpayment in respect of any tax shall be void if a refund of
such overpayment would be considered erroneous under § 6o8."
Section 607 (which is related to the above), 45 STAT. 874 (1928), INT. REv. CODE
§ 3770 (a) (2) : "Any tax . . . assessed or paid after the expiration of the period
of limitation properly applicable thereto shall be considered an overpayment and shall
be credited or refunded to the taxpayer ..
2. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the instant case on Mar. 25, 1946.
14 U. S. L. WEEK 3331.
3. 295 U. S. 247, 262 (935).
The taxpayer was allowed to recoup a barred overpayment of an estate tax against an existing income tax deficiency for the same year
which was levied on the same receipt of money. It is.interesting to note that although
this case was decided after the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1928, the Supreme
Court did not mention § 6o8 and § 6o9. See also Dixie Margarine Co. v. Commissioner, 15 F. (2d) 445 (C. C. A. 6th, I940) ; Dunigan v. United States, 23 F. Supp.
467 (Ct. Cl., 1938) ; Mills v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 738 (N. D. N. Y., 294o). But
see Lyeth v. Hoey, 112 F. (2d) 4, 7 (C. C. A. 2d, 194o).
4. 302 U. S. 56 (937). In McConnell, The Doctrine of Recoupment in Federal
Taxation (1942) 28 VA. L. REv. 577, 592-6oo a strong argument is made to the effect
that recoupment was not in issue in this case. However, it would seem that sufficient
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income tax deficiency against an existing income tax overpayment of a later
year. But there are certain situations which fall outside of these sections
and there recoupment should, and apparently will, be given full play.
Thus, where an erroneous refund, recovery of which is barred, is asserted
as recoupment against an existing overpayment, or vice versa, it should be
allowed 5 because the obligation to return an erroneous refund is not a tax
liability. 6 And estoppel has been held to override these sections, 7 because
the taxpayer has waived their protection. But in many cases the devices
used by the courts to allow recoupment are questionable. Where trustees
paid a tax with respect to income of the trust estate which should have
been paid by the trust beneficiary, they were not allowed to recover the
This
tax paid after collection of it from the beneficiary was barred."
result was permitted because under § 322 of the Revenue Act of 1928,1
which governs the adjustment of income tax liabilities, the Commissioner
could not make a credit since the returns of different taxpayers were involved and hence § 607, § 6o8, and § 609 did not apply.' 0 But this view
hinges on interpreting these sections as 1administrative provisions which
And in Lewis-v. Reynolds 12
supplement § 322, and that is just not so.
the Supreme Court did not permit recovery of an income tax overpayment
where the taxpayer sued after further deficiency assessment was barred,
and it appeared on recomputation of the tax that a greater amount was
owed than what had already been paid. This decision has been rationalized
on the theory that determination of the propriety of the refund necessarily
entails recomputation of the whole tax and hence the process is one of
abatement rather than credit.' 3 However, mathematically a credit would
seem to be involved in a Lewis case situation, and again there is an assumption that § 607, § 608, and § 609 are administrative provisions. It
has also been held that these sections do not retroactively take away the
facts were before the Court to allow a recoupment if the Court had been so inclined.
See also American Light & Traction Co. v. Harrison, 142 F. (2d) 639 (C. C. A. 7th,
1944).
5. Crosset Lumber Co. et al. v. United States, 87 F. (2d) 930 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937);

Smith et al. v. United States, 22 F. Supp. ioli (E. D. Pa., 1938).
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HARv. L. REv. 496, 501, n. 36.

6. See Kelley v. United States, 3o F. (2d) 193 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929).
7. R. H. Stearns Co. v. United States, 291 U. S. 54 (1934); Naumkeag Steam
Cotton Co. v. United States, 2 F. Supp. 126 (Ct. Cl., 1933).

Logically, in a proper

situation, estoppel should be enforced against the government; but for the difficulty
of doing this see Maguire and Zimet, Hobson's Choice and Similar Practices in Federal Taxation (1935)

48 HARv. L. REV. 1281, 1299-1310.

8. Stone v. White, 301 U. S. 532 (1937) ; Herman v. White, 25 F. Supp. 587 (D.
C. Mass., 1938). But cf. Lyman v. United States, 22 F. Supp. 14 (D. C. Mass., 1938).

For the similarity of the factual situations in Stone v. White and McEachern v. Rose,
see (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 439.
9. 45 STAT. 861, INT. REv. CODE § 322.

I0. For this interpretation of Stone v. White, see McEachern v. Rose, 302 U. S.
56, 63 (I937), and Lyeth v. Hoey, 112 F. (2d) 4, 7, 8 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940). However,
the result of Stone v. White permitted the Commissioner to make such a credit.
ii. § 607, § 6o8, and § 6og replaced § 1io6 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1926, and was
meant to define the rights of both the government and the taxpayer upon the expiration of the statute of limitations against either. H. R. REl. No. 2, 7oth Cong., ist
Sess. (1927), 1939-1 (2) Cum. BULL. 384, 4o6, 407; SEN. REP. No. 960, 70th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1927), 1939-1 (2) Cum. BULL. 409, 437, 438. But cf. the dissenting opinion
in Lyeth v. Hoey, 112 F. (2d) 4, 8 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
12. 284 U. S. 281 (1932), as vnodified in 284 U. S. 599 (1932).
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right of recoupment; 1 but the language is broad enough to provide for
this. In the instant case the court allowed recoupment on the grounds
that the public policy of encouraging prompt payment of taxes requires
the application of these sections only against the government; 15 however,
Stone v. White and the Lewis case indicate that the government will be
allowed to recoup in a proper situation. It would seem that some of the
confusion surrounding the subject would be dispersed if the propriety of
allowing recoupment 16 were made to turn 17 on the balance to be struck
between the aim, on the one hand regularly to collect as much revenue
as possible by laying to rest stale claims,' 8 and on the
other the desire to
19
This approach 20
make adjustments where inconsistency is involved.
would seem to require the failure of recoupment in the instant case, 2 1
because of the remoteness of the years involved,2 2 the fact that the government has not assumed an inconsistent position which has put the taxpayer
at a disadvantage; the fact that the deficiency in 1935 was not based on
the same item as the overpayment for 1919 to 1922; and the taxpayer's
neglect in not saving his remedy for 1919 to 1922 although he had originally protested the payment.
14 West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. v. McElligott, 4o F. Supp. 765 (S. D. N. Y.,
1941). Contra: Lynchburg Coal & Coke Co. v. United States, 47 F. Supp. 916 (Ct.
Cl., 1942). The court in the instant case placed some reliance on this theory (instant

case at 525, 526).

15. This theory was fully developed in the appellee's brief in the instant case at
pp. 15-2o, and in the appendix to the brief McEachern v. Rose was explained on these
grounds.
16. It should be noted that under INT. REV. CODE: § 272 (g) the Tax Court does
not have jurisdiction to apply recoupment. Commissioner v. Gooch Milling and Elevator Co., 320 U. S. 418 (x943).
17. Of course the language of § 607, § 6o8, and § 6og is broad enough to prohibit
recoupment in all cases by either the government or the taxpayer, and perhaps this is
what should be done. The problem is really legislative, because judicial remedies will
only promote litigation, and there is already enough opportunity for that in our tax system. Perhaps, judicial refusal to make adjustments will lead to the necessary legislative
action. However, the suggested view is advanced because it appears that the courts
will endeavor to work out a solution (witness the devices already mentioned). If this
is true, then the controversy should be recognized for what it is.
iS. Note (1939) 52 HARv. L. REv. 496, 498.
I9. The need for some adjustment is made clear in McConnell, supra note 4 at
6oo et seq. This need has been recognized by the Congress in the passage of such acts
as § 820 of the Revenue Act of 1938, INT. Ray. CODE § 3801, which provides for adjustments of income tax after the expiration of the statute of limitations, and Congress
recognized the propriety of adjustment by judicial action because § 820 was intended
to supplement judicial remedies. Sax. REP. No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. (938),
1939-I (2) Cum. BULL. 779, S15. The Stone v. White and McEachern v. Rose situations are now covered by § 820. For a discussion of the purpose and scope of § 82o
see Maguire, Surrey, and Traynor, Section 82o of the Revenue Act of 1938 (939) 48
YALE L. J. 509 and Note (938) 52 HARv. L. RaV. 300.
2o. The factors to be considered among others are: the nearness in point of time
of the claims of the taxpayer and government; to what extent the party seeking recoupment could and should have protected himself; whether or not the party against
whom recoupment is sought has by his inconsistency placed the other party at a disadvantage; whether the same item of income or deduction is involved; the type of
taxes included in the controversy and their impact on one another.
21. However, in Dixie Margarine Co. v. Commissioner, 115 F. (2d) 445 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1940), which is a case directly in point with the instant case, recoupment by
the taxpayer was allowed; but the court did not discuss § 6o8 and § 609. Although
this case arose before the Board of Tax Appeals, and hence would have been reversed
on jurisdictional grounds if it had gone to the Supreme Court, it is still of value on the
question of recoupment.
22. In Lewis v. Reynolds, Bull v. United States, and Stone v. White, where the
Supreme Court allowed recoupment as a defense, the claim of both the government and
the taxpayer arose in the same year; and in McEachern v. Rose, where recoupment
was not allowed, different years were at issue. However, recoupment need not depend
entirely upon the same year being in controversy.

